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1. FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY INTEGRATION FOR THE CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPEAN NEW MEMBERS 
The full EU membership of CEE countries assumes their full EMU participation. This 
corresponds to the Copenhagen accession criteria, namely they should have the “ability to 
take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union”. They have no possibility of opting out, like the United Kingdom and 
Denmark.  
As it is stated in the accession treaties, all countries will take over and implement the 
acquis under the chapter of economic and monetary union as from the date of their entry, 
while some derogation are applied: “from the date of accession, the provision of the original 
Treaties and acts adopted by the institutions and the European Central Bank before accession 
shall be binding on the new Member States and shall apply in those states under the 
conditions laid down in those Treaties and in this Act.” (Treaty of Accession 2003, article 2.) 
The immediate participation in the single market upon membership assumed by the 
Accession Treaties was possible, because of a pre-accession transition period, which 
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basically fell between 1995 and 2004, the date of entry. On the basis of the Commission’s 
recommendation, at the June 1995 Cannes summit the Council approved a White Paper in 
which proposals were formulated for the applicant CEE countries with regard to their gradual 
adaptation to the 1992 program of the single internal market and their integration into it (legal 
harmonization, application of standards, etc.). As by 2004, most of the recommendations of 
the White Paper were implemented by the candidates, the immediate acceptance of the acquis 
communautaires concerning the single market had no obstacles. 
For the old member countries the SEM’s completion and the first stage of EMU 
overlapped. So the de facto full membership in the single market of the new members meant 
that they informally joined the second stage of the EMU. Parallel, they were assumed to 
comply with requirements of stability oriented economic policies, and start to implement their 
convergence programs. With that they entered into the second stage of the EMU, in fact, 
again right from the beginning of their EU membership. The member countries have to treat 
their monetary policy as a matter of common concern. It should be noted that contrary to old 
members, the CEE new entrants, from the first moment of their membership in the Union, 
will ‘co-exist’ with the single currency. 
The joining the acquis communautaires upon entry meant that contrary to previous 
enlargements, there was no transition period for the CEE new members, except in some 
special fields, while most of the derogations were technical. The four major fields of 
derogations were: 
 Free movement of labour (7 years); 
 Selling of arable land (9 years); 
 Direct payments under CAP postponed till 2013; 
 Joining the Euro-Zone – no deadline. 
 
While committing to the monetary integration, both the old and the new member countries 
were divided from the beginning how rapidly and how early should the new entrants join the 
euro-zone. In fact, this was the issue, which was the subject of very broad and intensive 
dispute. Many believed, and particularly, the old members for several reasons, that the 
transition period between joining the EU and entering euro-zone might last for many years, 
probably more than a decade. That was particularly the view of many Western experts, shared 
by Community officials.  
The official commitments about an early and rapid euro-zone entry on the side of new 
members were broadly expressed. The assumptions about euro-zone entries ranged from 2006 
and 2010 (basically between 4-6 years). According to the official decision of the government 
and the Central Bank in Hungary in 2002 the euro would be introduced in 2008. In fact, the 
market analysts set this date to 2008 for six new CEE members, as the most probable 
possibility (Világggazdaság, 11 November 2002.) In general, the central banks and the 
financial circles were those who forced early entry, while the governments, probably because 
of the constraint of the cutting budget expenditures, were less enthusiastic.  
By 2015, from the 13 new members (11 from the East) 7 have introduced the euro. In 
fact, Slovenia (2007), Slovakia (2009), Malta and Cyprus (2008) managed to join the euro 
zone before the outbreak of the financial crisis. The Baltic countries have stuck to their 
determination in spite of the crisis. Estonia joined the euro-zone in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and 
Lithuania in 2015. For the other 6, the timing of euro zone joining is uncertain.  
In our paper, we focus on two major issues. First, how far the five Central European 
countries comply with the monetary integration maturity criteria and how far they are able 
adjust to all of the circumstances and consequences, which follow from their participation in 
monetary integration. Second, we try to explain, why the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland made a total turn concerning the euro issue, and what the main interests and positions 
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behind these drastic changes are. We analyse the case of the two late comers (Croatia and 
Romania), who have even a chance to overtake the former three, and join the euro-zone 
before them. 
 
2. MONETARY INTEGRATION MATURITY OF CENTRAL EUROPE 
2.1. Theoretical frameworks 
Every integration organization sets certain membership conditions or criteria for those who 
wish to join it. It raises the question of integration maturity of a given country or group of 
countries.2 It relates to several factors; level of integration and the type of the countries, which 
want to join the given organization. 
The examination of questions of integration maturity became timely in two respects, 
from the 1990s. First, the question of integration maturity has arisen more and more 
unavoidably in connection with the increasingly close forms of integration, and the program 
of economic and monetary union (‘positive integration’) has shown that at this level, 
integration maturity cannot be left out of consideration. Although, market liberalization 
(‘negative integration’) is not without consequences, but they are mostly unilateral and 
asymmetric (the less developed, weaker partner could lose more) and the retroactive effects 
are not manifested in a direct manner. As the history of European integration showed, the 
question of unequal division of advantages was addressed either by asymmetric trade 
liberalization or financial transfer in favor of weaker partners (asymmetric associations). 
The situation changed with economic union. The reciprocal effects are heightened and 
become direct. The less developed partner’s economic difficulties (budget deficit or regional 
inequalities) have repercussions on the economy of the more developed, and can destabilize it 
(e.g. by triggering inflation) in more direct way. The decision to join in an economic union 
has fundamental effects on the institutional and political structure of the country in question. 
In this connection maturity or preparedness for integration is an issue that has to be examined 
and is a common interest. 
The second reason was the aspiration for full membership of the Central and East 
European countries. In their case, considering the huge differences in development and the 
number of CEE candidates, and need of transformation from Soviet type central planning to 
market economy, it was clear that enlargements assume far-reaching changes before entering 
the Union. 
Under these conditions, in the early 1990s, the EU had to set two types of accession 
criteria, which assumed a certain level of integration maturity in the given context. In 1991, 
the Maastricht criteria formulated the basic stability conditions for joining EMU. In 1993, the 
Copenhagen criteria set the requirements for EU membership for CEE candidates. The 
Copenhagen Criteria were in practice attempting to formulate a certain desirable minimum 
transformation for these countries, while it already referred to the requirement of participation 
in the single market. 
In relation to the monetary integration the following basic criteria of integration 
maturity were formulated as: 
1. Achievement of a certain state of integration of real-economy (integratedness).  
2. Market economy (“functioning”), inclusion into the single market. 
3. Macro-stability and stabilization (most of all meeting the Maastricht convergence 
criteria). 
4. Integration (absorption) capacities of the Union. 
 
                                                 
2 The question of integration maturity was analyzed by a research group of the Department of World Economy at 
Corvinus University of Budapest, and in a program financed by the Hungarian National Research and 
Development Plan between 2002-2004 (see Palankai 2004; 2005). 
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We have to emphasize that fulfilment of these maturity criteria is not only a precondition of 
integration but also the only way in which the advantages of integration outweigh its costs. 
This is the way in which integration serves their interests, and it is an expression of 
integration maturity. 
 
2.2. State of monetary integration maturity of East Central European countries 
2.2.1. State of real-integratedness 
The creation of a single currency assumes a certain state and level of integration of the given 
organisation. No question that in absence of a minimum level of relations, a common 
currency is hardly imaginable. In this context, the level of integration is conceived in terms of 
intensity of relations, interconnectedness and interdependence (integratedness). It would be 
hard to define what the exact level should be, but it is clear that it should be high enough in 
terms of transaction costs. Only a sufficiently high level of integration can offer savings in 
transaction cost. As the analyses on the Euro showed, in the EU by the 1990s, as result of the 
creation of single market, transaction costs were substantial. The introduction of the Euro was 
an important factor in increasing competitiveness of the EU companies and countries. In fact, 
the collapse of the Euro would be a fatal blow to the competitiveness of the EU and would 
lead to the marginalisation of continent.  
Real-integration can be measured by a great number of indices and parameters. We 
use only few of them, but they largely represent and indicate where the real integration 
processes stand and how they developed in the last decades. We analyse and measure real-
integration by intensity of relations (trade or factors), interdependence, interconnectedness 
and transnationalisation of company sector. 
 
1. Share of export and import to GDP, which can be related to total trade (TXt/Y×100 or 
TMt/Y×100, where TXt is total export and TMt the total import), or to intra-regional trade  
(TXi/Y×100 or TMi/Y×100, where TXi refers to the intra-regional export and TMi to import). 
The former indicates the intensity of global integration (integratedness), while the latter is a 
demonstration of the intensity of regional trade integration. The annual data and their change 
express the intensity and integratedness, i.e., the state and the dynamics of the integration 
process. The indices, besides intensities, also indicate openness and dependencies. The higher 
the indices, the greater the country’s openness and its dependence on external factors and 
processes.  
The about 5 decades of European integration has shown a very rapid intensification of 
trade relations. The trade of the EC/EU (both total and internal) has expanded rapidly, and the 
growth of the total export of goods and services was around twice as rapid than that of GDP. 
Due to these processes, the intensity of trade relations expanded substantially, and in half a 
century, and it increased from a low (nearly 20%) to a high level (more than 40%). The same 
happened in terms of the internal trade, its share in GDP from about 8% trebled to nearly 
25%; and the structural openness, particularly for some smaller countries, reached a 
particularly high level (Eurosat 2014). 
In the past 50 years, the economy of the member states has strongly internationalised. 
This is a new quality, which is none other than integration. 
The intensity of the trade integration (goods and services) of EU members shows 
plenty of differences and extremities. There are extremely high intensity countries with above 
80% trade share in GDP (LU, BE, SK, HU, and ML), while Greece is close to the low 
intensity (22%), and in terms of goods it is in the no intensity (8%) band, and in this respect 
the same is with Cyprus. In some sense, this is some of the dimensions of peculiarities of 
Greek membership in the Euro-zone. There is no rule that the same level of integratedness is 
required for a monetary integration, but the great extremities can create tensions. 
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In general, the developed small countries have high or very high intensity of external 
economic relations and high openness of their economies, both in term of their regional and 
global integration. This is supported by the different attempts of measuring integration 
(Globalisation or Interconnectedness Indices), and beyond the EU members, we can mention 
such countries as Switzerland, Norway or Singapore. It should be noted that besides the 
Benelux and the Scandinavian countries in spite of their somewhat lower level of 
development (per capita GDP), most of East-Central Europe and the Baltic countries belong 
to this very high intensity group. Some countries owe this status to their service economies 
(Luxemburg, Malta, Cyprus) as in terms of their goods export, they have more modest 
qualification. The same applies to Greece. Besides the developed large countries (except 
Germany), the Mediterranean EU members fall into the moderately low intensity group, with 
their 22-34% GDP-trade shares.  
 
2. Share of regional trade to total(TXi/TXt×100 orTM/TMt×100). It indicates the 
interconnectedness and regional concentration of the relations in the integration organisation. 
The strengthening of integration relations has meant an increase of the share of intra-
trade among the member countries. The growth of cooperation, however, was not 
proportional, as the process was characterised with sub-regional concentration, particularly 
among the neighbouring countries. This is a general characteristic of European integration, 
and the process was further strengthened by the various enlargements. 
When measuring sub-regional concentrations or connectedness, we can depart from 
the proportions of external and internal trade. These proportions for the whole Union are 
roughly 67-33%, as far as internal and external trade are concerned, and can be used as a basis 
of comparison. 
EU internal trade is highly concentrated sub-regionally. The Western European EU 
members, besides the high intensity of their trade, are characterised by a high level of 
connectedness (which is above 67%) as well. In the case of Belgium and Ireland, about 85-
86% of their intra-export goes to the sub-regional partners, but this proportion is close to 65% 
in case of the UK. About 75% of the intra-trade takes place within the Western European core 
countries.  
Inside the core, Germany is a central and strategic partner. On average, 23.2% of the 
EU total trade is provided by Germany. The two extremes in this respect are Estonia with 
8.8% and Austria with 43.1% of the German share. In spite of the high German participation, 
the countries of the region are also strategic partners of Germany, as their share is above 10% 
in the export trade of Germany. In terms of internal export, this is the case with France, Italy, 
The Netherlands and the UK, with Belgium and Austria close to this position. Consequently, 
despite of the German preponderance, the core countries’ relations are characterised by 
relatively balanced interdependence.  
The other main region that is highly connected with the Western European Center is 
East Central Europe. In fact, East-Central Europe is connected to the West largely through 
West-Central Europe (Austria, Germany and Italy), and this connectedness of Central Europe 
in total is quite high. East Central Europe is particularly closely connected to Germany 
(accounting for around a third of the trade relations). Beyond that, the relations are balanced 
in the region and there are no unilateral dependences. The only exceptions are the Czech–
Slovak relations, and the strategic dependence of Slovenia on Austria, France and Italy. In a 
similar vein, Central Europe is also a strategic partner for Austria (20%) and Italy (11%).  
Germany is the number one partner for 21 countries. It is number two for Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Portugal and Spain, and comes as third for Latvia (12%) and fourth for Estonia 
(8.8%).  
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The intensity of interconnectedness can be measured by confronting shares of trade 
and population. For the different sub-regions, their share in internal trade and total population 
is compared: Xia/Xt × 100/Pa/Pt × 100 (Xi-internal export; P – population, and “a” stands for 
the country or the region). The quotient of the two indicates the interconnectedness of the 
region by filtering out the differences that arise from the size of the regions. However, 
differences arising from the levels of development remain (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Intensity of interconnectedness for internal export in the main sub-regions of 
the EU in 2009 
Region 
Share of export in EU 
total in % 
Share of 
population in 
total in %- 
Interconnectedness 
Quotient 
EU27 100 100 1 
Western Europe 74.8 60.1 1.25 
Northern EU 6.0 5.0 1.20 
East Central EU 10.5 10.3 1.02 
Baltic members 0.7 0.8 0.93 
Southern EU 6.6 13.8 0.47 
Latin EU* 23.9 36.2 0.66 
 
* FR, IT, ES, PT. 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
 
The data in Table 1 reflect the minimally above average interconnectedness of East-Central 
Europe. If we take into account the differences in the levels of development, this 
interconnectedness is intensive as compared to Western Europe and Scandinavia. The low 
interconnectedness of the Southern EU is striking. The picture does not change if we consider 
only “Latin” countries of the sub-region. 
As the sub-regional trade relations indicate, the distance or the geographic closeness 
of the countries do count. This is further strengthened by traditions, historic ties, or cultural or 
linguistic similarities.  
In general, European integration does not represent a monolithic economic bloc; it is 
structured by sub-regional concentrations in which Germany plays a dominant connecting 
role. East Central European integration to the West-European means close connection to the 
Euro-zone.  
 
3. The share of capital import (CM/Y×100) and export (CX/Y×100) to GDP and to each other 
(CX/CM×100) indicate the intensity of capital relations. In our present analysis, concerning 
factor integration we concentrate on capital movements while that of labour force is left out. 
In terms of capital import (to GDP), Belgium (200%), Ireland (111%), Sweden, 
Estonia and The Netherlands (above 80%), and Hungary (78%), Czech Republic (64%), 
Slovakia(60%) and Bulgaria(63%) are characterised by a very high intensity. The high 
Central European proportions are the results of massive investments in the region. In the case 
of The Netherlands, what is reflected is the traditional foreign investor role. The foreign 
investments are highly intensive in the UK, Denmark, Portugal, Austria. Spain and Poland. 
Only Italy (17%) and Greece (13%) can be considered as the low intensity category. The low 
level of Greece’s global and European integration is also expressed in these respects (OECD 
2012).  
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Besides high intensities, the most developed countries are characterized with net 
external investment positions. In most of these countries, the capital export is about a third 
higher than the stock of received capital. 
In the last decade, there has been a start of capital export with regard to the new 
Eastern members. The pioneers in this process are Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia. In the case 
of Hungary, if the ca. €15 bn investments abroad are compared with the €80 bn FDI in the 
country, the rate is only about 20%. In the case of the other countries, these investments have 
only just started, and they are typically around or below 10% per cent in relation to the FDI in 
the country.  
This is a reflection of the asymmetry of their integration. “Capital export is closely 
related to the level of development, and in the case of an expanding economy, the increase of 
this activity is a necessity. At the same time, there is no rule to regulate how the level of 
development and capital export should be related to one another. Therefore, in absolute terms, 
it cannot be determined whether Hungary is ahead or behind the ‘average’. This is dependent 
on the level of development of geographically close countries (as they are more attractive as a 
terrain of potential investment) and their capital absorption capacity.” (Világgazdaság, 30 
June 2004)  
 
4. From the 1970s onwards, the start of the capital export of European companies was 
accompanied by their growing transnationalisation. The EU has become one of the main 
areas of global integration, in which process European TNCs have played a leading role. 
From the 1980s, this was strengthened by rapid integration and the transnationalisation of 
international financial markets. Accordingly, the economies of the core EU countries have 
become highly transnationalised, both in terms of their positions in the national economies, 
and in the expansion and competitiveness of the global economy.  
In relation to TNCs, it is generally agreed that transnational networks is a more 
suitable term. Transnational networks are large groups of small and medium sized enterprises, 
which cover research and development, production, financing and various different services.  
Hungary and the new Eastern EU members, as result of the high intensity of their 
capital integration, are parts of this transnationalisation process. This is, however, largely 
one-sided and asymmetric based on the domination of foreign investors. The one-sidedness 
has started to dissolve, but the new Eastern EU members still have a long way to go in the 
process. In the last few years, several Hungarian (and other Central European) companies 
(MOL, OTP Bank, Trigranit, Telekom, Fornetti, etc.) have aspired for a transnational status 
and have applied such strategies and positions. Their expansion, however, is mostly limited to 
the neighbouring countries.  
Asymmetries are particularly characteristic of transnational networking. Moreover, the 
absence of established “national” TNCs is accompanied with the low participation of local 
SMEs in the global integration processes. This is particularly striking in comparison to the 
core countries.  
In spite of differences, the EU belongs to the most highly integrated regions of the 
global economy. This is a strong basis for its monetary integration. In the EU, by the 1990s, 
the real-economic conditions for monetary integration had been created. 
In the last 20 years, the Central European economies have become one of the most 
open and integrated economies in the world economy. About 90% of their trade is conducted 
in liberalised frameworks, and their economy is fully exposed to global competition. That is a 
favourable condition for their monetary integration. In terms of real integration, the Central 
European countries have the potentials to exploit the advantages of that monetary integration. 
 
2.3. From functioning market economy to single market 
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The monetary union followed logically from the program for a single European market. 
Complete liberalization of the capital markets threatened the effectiveness of national 
monetary policies, and the only possible way of “escaping forwards” was the creation of a 
single currency. “The economic advantages of 1992 are certainly not fully achievable without 
a single currency, especially in the field of financial market integration. In addition the EMS 
in its present stage of development may not be compatible with complete capital market 
liberalization as required by 1992” (European Commission 1990: 17-18). According to 
Padoa-Schioppa, the single market tries to undertake an impossible task, that of reconciling 
the four priorities of economic policy, namely free trade, completely free movement of 
capital, fixed exchange rates and national autonomy in following monetary policy. “These 
four elements form what I call an ‘inconsistent quartet’: economic theory and historical 
experience have repeatedly shown that these four elements cannot coexist, and that at least 
one has to give way”(Padoa-Schioppa 1989: 373). Thus, in the interest of the normal 
functioning of the single market, monetary integration, or EU-level centralization of monetary 
policy, is required. This is achieved with the EMU. Monetary union is supported by the broad 
integration of national markets.  
As monetary integration was concerned, it was clear from the beginning that the 
different countries were not equally prepared, and that meant a certain risk for the future 
stability and satisfactory operation of the project. There were substantial differences in the 
interests among the countries. It is not surprising that so far the euro has been introduced only 
in 19 countries, while participation of further countries is delayed by either formal opting out 
agreements, or by different types of policy choices, which put their joining into the uncertain 
future. The same applies to some of the reform packages, particularly those which were 
brought for improving the governance of the euro-zone. In these context, we should speak 
about “multi-speed” or “variable geometry” Europe. 
A normally functioning market economy is a starting condition in relation to every 
form of integration. The whole theoretical and analytical system of integration economics is 
based on this assumption. Only with the proper functioning of market mechanisms can the 
advantages of internal free trade be exploited. In some sense, the question, as far as the factor 
markets are concerned (flexibility of prices and movements) are closely related to the 
requirements of the optimum currency area. 
We know there is no such thing as a “perfectly” functioning market. It is no accident 
that the customs union and common market were accompanied from the outset by stringent 
supervision and regulation of competition, and internally competition policy had to be raised 
also to community level, this being associated later with wide-ranging legal harmonization to 
ensure freedom and equality in trade. Thus to achieve a “functioning market economy” many 
measures were applied. The 1992 program of the single European market sought to 
systematically eliminate all the real obstacles in the way of the “four freedoms”, and 
ultimately extend the conditions for a really “functioning market economy”.  
As result of broad and complex transformation of their economies, the CE countries 
achieved the status of “functioning market” by the end of 1990s (Hungary in 1999). This 
meant that by acquiring full membership in 2004, they fulfilled that Copenhagen criterion. In 
case of the later comers (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) these were implemented later, and 
the single market regulations were introduced with the EU entry. 
Concerning the EMU, the question marks which arose were about the derogations 
concerning the 7 year transition period with regard to free movement of labour (with the 
similar 9 year delay in acquisition of arable land in the CEE candidate countries by 
foreigners). Of course, one can argue that really it is the free movement of capital that counts 
mostly from the point of view of the smooth functioning of the EMU, and that was fulfilled. 
Although labour mobility is considered important by the theories of the optimum currency 
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area in terms of avoiding aggravation of regional differences, from the point of view of the 
CEE countries’ joining the euro-zone these were not exclusive limitations. In reality, only 
Austria and Germany insisted on limiting the free movement of labour, while most of the 
others with some delays and exceptions opened their labour markets. Later the movement of 
people from the East to the West proved that the formal derogations had no significant 
limiting impacts in this respect. From this point of view the question of arable land was a 
marginal issue.  
The high level of real-integratedness and the single market are the two legs of 
monetary integration, and any single currency cannot be created without them. By the 1990s, 
these conditions were secured for the EU. For the CEE new members, the same applies by 
their EU entry as well. 
 
2.4. Macro-economic stability and meeting convergence criteria 
Economic stability is an important factor in integration maturity from the point of view of the 
normal functioning of the market, and consequently from the point of view of the ability to 
exploit the advantages of any market integration.  
Macro-economic stability and integration are mutually dependent, therefore while it is 
one of the preconditions of successful integration, at the same time it is also an indicator of 
the success of that integration. There have been lengthy, chicken-and-egg discussions about 
the performance of the economies of the EC countries, particularly in the 1960s, when no one 
could decide which was more important: rapid economic growth promoting smooth and rapid 
trade integration, or dynamic intra-trade, which was then supposedly one of the main factors 
in rapid economic growth.  
The collapse of Soviet systems was accompanied by “transformation crisis”. It meant 
deep recession (between 1989 and 1993, a drop of GDP between 20-40%), most countries 
suffered hyper inflation (more than three digits, except Hungary and Czechoslovakia), 
unemployment jumping above 10% (formerly non existent in most of the countries), and the 
deterioration of budget balances. The countries by late 1990s and early 2000s consolidated 
their economies. 
In fact, by the time of gaining full EU membership, most of the Eastern countries got 
relatively close to meeting the Maastricht criteria (see Table 2), and the fulfilment of these in 
a relatively short time largely depended on the countries’ political will and determination. 
Hungary was close to meeting the Maastricht criteria in 2001, and the deadlines for euro zone 
membership were realistic. The stabilisation policies, however, which would have been 
necessary anyway, did not happen, and the possibilities of euro-zone membership faded away. 
Instead, by 2006, the country got into a serious crisis. Beyond contractual obligations, most of 
the analyses agree that the introduction of the euro corresponded with the national interests. 
 
Table 2. State of fulfilment of the convergence criteria in the 11 new EU members, 
2002 – 2014* 
 
Country Year Inflation (%) 
Budget deficit 
(% of GDP) 
Public debt 
(% of GDP) 
Interest rate 
(nominal) 
Czech Republic 
2002 1.4 -6.8 28.8 4.9 
2008 6.3 -2.7 30.0 4.6 
2014 0.9 -1.9 45.8 2.2 
Hungary 
2002 5.2 -9.2 57.2 7.1 
2008 6.0 -3.8 72.9 8.2 
2014 1.0 -2.9 79.5 5.8 
Poland 2002 1.9 -3.6 41.1 7.4 
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2008 4.2 -3.7 47.2 6.1 
2014 0.6 -2.9 49.2 4. 
Slovakia 
2002 2.0 -5.7 43.3 5.3 
2008 3.9 -2.4 28.2 4.7 
2014 1.5 -2.6 55.4 3.2 
Slovenia 
2002 7.5 -2.4 29.5. 6.4 
2008 5.5 -1.8 21.6 4.6 
2014 1.9 -14.6 78.1 5.8 
Latvia 
2002 2.0 -2.7 14.1 5.4 
2008 13.3 -4.1 19.5 6.4   
2014 0.0 -0.9 38.2 3.3 
Lithuania 
2002 0.4 -1.5 22.4 6.1 
2008 11.1 -3.3 15.6 5.6 
2014 1.2 -2.6 39.0 3.8 
Estonia 
2002 3.6 -1.4 5.3 4.3 
2008 10.6 -2.7 4.6 4.0 
2014 3.2 -0.5 10.1 0.75 
Croatia 
2002 2.1 -5.1 38.3 6.25 
2008 5.8 -2.7 36.0 6.0 
2014 1.1 -3.8 67.1 4.8 
Bulgaria 
2002 6.1 1.8 36.1 5.4 
2008 12.0 1.8 14.1 5.4 
2014 -0.8 -1.5 23.13 3.5 
Romania 
2002 11.9 -1.2 18.6 4.0 
2008 7.9 -5. 4  13.3 7.7 
2014  2.1 -2.2 40.1 5.3 
Eurozone 
2002 2.2 -3.1 69.1 2.0 
2008 3.3 -0 .6 66.2 4.0 
2014 1.4 -2.9 92.1 0.75 
Source: ECB (2004; 2010); European Commission (2014) and Eurostat.  
 
The candidates had no problem with public debt, and with the exception of Hungary, they 
were far below the 60% reference value. The average debt level of the new CEE members 
was around 32% of their GDP (in case of Hungary 57%), which was much lower than it was 
in the case with most of the first euro-zone members before their joining. Concerning budget 
deficits and inflation their performance was much more varying, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland had relatively high budget deficits and had to make serious 
efforts to comply. (In 2002, Hungary had an extremely high budget deficit, which was close 
to 10%, but by 2003 it was brought down to 4.8%.) In terms of inflation, only Hungary and 
Slovenia were high above the euro-zone averages (and Estonia only slightly).  
The financial crisis brought substantial deterioration in macro-performance. In 2009, 
there was an unprecedented fall of production in the EU, with an average 5.6% drop of GDP 
in one year in the 27 countries. However, the recession of the Western and the Southern EU 
members has been more moderate, and only Ireland (5.5% contraction) was close to the 
average. The only exception was Finland, with an 8.5% recession. At the same time, a 
dramatic loss of production was experienced in the Baltic countries (14-18%), and it was 
above average in Slovenia, Hungary and Romania. In 2009, out of the 27 members, only 
Poland was able to achieve a positive economic growth (1.6%).  
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The global financial crisis brought dramatic changes in the budgetary situation of the 
EU members. By 2009, the average budgetary deficit of the EU jumped from the 1.8% level 
of 2004 to 6.7% (for the Euro-zone this was 6.3%). Compared to 2004, the budget balance 
worsened in every country except Germany, Austria and Malta, and in some countries it went 
above 10%. The budget deficit of Greece doubled at 15.6%, but record deficits were also 
produced by Ireland (13.9%), the U. K. (11.5%), Spain (11.2%) and Portugal (10.2%). With 
regard to the new members, in 2009 the deficit of Latvia (9.8%), Lithuania (9.4%) and 
Romania (9%) got close to ten per cent, but Poland (7.4%) and Slovakia (8%) were also 
above the average. The deficit of Hungary was only 4.6%, but due to its own crisis, a record 
deficit (9.2%) was produced in 2006.  
As a consequence of the crisis, between 2009 and 2014, the public debt of all the 
countries increased, and such euro-zone members as Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland (above 
120-170% debt levels) or Spain got into a serious sovereign debt crisis. In 2008, the euro-
zone public debt was 66%, which jumped to 85% by 2009, and it further accelerated to 92% 
by 2014. In 2014, out of the Euro-zone members only Luxembourg and Finland, and the new 
Eastern members (except Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia) were bellow the 60% ceiling. 
In spite of several improvements, the crisis is not yet over. This particularly applies to 
the debt and the growth crisis, and the solution of the Greek crisis remains uncertain. Grexit 
cannot be excluded, and it would have far reaching consequences for the whole monetary 
union. The migration crisis creates new political tensions among the EU members, and the 
European integration arrived to a cross road. 
In spite all of this, by 2014, the six CEE eurozone candidates consolidated their 
economies, and they got close again to fulfilling the Maastricht criteria. As far as the main 
criteria are concerned, they correspond to Maastricht, and their compliance rather calls for 
legal and policy decisions. All need legislation in terms of harmonizing their Central Bank 
independence with TFEU and their integration into the ESCB. None of them are in the ERM2, 
but exchange rate stabilization rather depends on external factors and policy decisions. In case 
of Bulgaria, the currency board means stricter stability conditions, than the ERM. The same 
applies to official exchange rates. The inflation is in all cases below the 1.7% reference value, 
and in case of Romania is very close to it (2.1%). The budget deficit, with the exception of 
Croatia (3.8%), is below 3% of GDP, and the debt levels are between 40-50% of GDP. On the 
one extreme is Bulgaria with its 23%, and on the other Croatia with 67% and Hungary with 
79% debt levels. Both countries could be able to produce a declining rate of their 
indebtedness. 
Among the new Eastern members, the joining of the euro-zone or staying out can not 
be explained by any “objective” conditions or factors (level of development or macro-
economic performance), which would have determined the decisions of the given countries. 
Slovakia was not better positioned or had any particular factor which could explain why the 
country joined the euro-zone on the one hand, and why Hungary or Czech Republic have 
abstained from this step on the other. On the contrary, in many respects, the prospects and 
possibilities of the latter two countries were better than that of Slovakia. The same applies to 
the comparison of Poland or the Baltic countries. The decisions were politically motivated 
and depended on political will and determination of the country. In 2001 or 2002, the chances 
of Hungary joining the Eurozone were not worse than that of Slovakia, the difference was 
rather in perceptions of the future and the expected consequences. In fact, the success or the 
failure of the euro-zone members were primarily determined by the adjustment policies of the 
given countries. 
 
2.5. Integration (absorption) capacities of the Union 
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The question of absorption or integration capacities first arose in relation to the Eastern 
enlargements. The Copenhagen accession criteria, in 1993, besides the requirements towards 
the candidates, refer to “The Union’s capacity to absorb new members.” The question was not 
clearly specified, and besides the budgetary implications, nothing else was concretely 
indicated. The problem was demonstrated by the Agenda 2000, where the financial resources 
allocated to the new members were already planned. As the later developments of the 
enlargement process proved, attention was only devoted to the minimum levels of meeting the 
accession criteria, but the majority of questions of joining (particularly the timing) were 
decided primarily on political grounds. Although the maturity considerations were followed, 
they played only secondary role.  
The euro was born from high real integratedness and the single market, but in its 
shaping and timing, the political factors also played an important role. Beyond strictly 
requiring the fulfillment of the Maastricht (monetary and fiscal) convergence criteria, the 
broader considerations of maturity were missing. How far these countries can be considered 
an optimal currency area formally was not examined. Certain deficiencies in integration 
maturity were neglected, and that particularly applied to the large differences among the new 
euro members. The institutional set up of the EMU was shaped on political grounds 
(minimizing the need for giving up sovereignty), and the necessary absorption capacities were 
poorly secured. The problems were demonstrated both in conceptual and constructional 
deficiencies of the monetary union project. 
 
a) The economic and monetary union created a new governance structure (multi-level), 
where all the levels (union, national, local, or even companies, organizations, or banks) had to 
adjust and their consistent cooperation and had to be secured in all dimensions. The euro 
construction, in this respect, was far not adequate, it had many deficiencies, and later during 
the crisis, they lead to disastrous consequences. The Economist rightly compared the euro 
zone to a boat, which “was fit only for fair-weather sailing, with an anarchic crew and no life 
boat.” (The Economist, 26 November 2011)  
b) The single currency called for common monetary policies, but the budgets remained in 
national competences. The Stability and Growth Pact set the frameworks and rules of national 
budgetary policies, but they were incomplete, indicatory and lacking strong enforcement 
mechanisms.  
c) The mechanisms of “automatic stabilizers”, characteristic for the classical monetary 
unions based on federal political structures, were totally lacking. The EU budget is far from 
meeting of requirements of a federal budget. In facts parallel with the creation of monetary 
union, instead of increasing its role, its resources were rather cut back. The role of structural 
funds was increased, but they were not enough to fulfill the correcting and compensation 
requirements related to social and regional disparities created by the monetary integration. 
d) In order to enforce tough discipline on the members, the no bail out rule was an 
important message for responsible policy behaviors. Later, under the circumstances of the 
global financial crisis, it proved to be unattainable and threatened with the collapse of the 
whole monetary union. 
e) The focus was on monetary and fiscal policies, while the financial markets (banking 
sector) were left out of attention. 
f) One of the main deficits were related to adequate national policies (policy mixes), 
which failed to adjust to the new conditions and requirements (proper income or structural 
policies among others). Instead of adaptations, some governments rather used the possibilities 
of free riding (using new cheap money for buying political popularity or votes), but the 
irresponsible behavior characterized the banks or individual investors (real estate bubble) as 
well. 
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g) Misunderstanding and over estimating the regulatory role of the market. The euro 
project was born in the atmosphere of ultra-liberalism of the 1990s, which expected a 
regulatory and disciplining role from the market. As it later turned out, the markets rather 
encouraged irresponsible behaviors and instead of disciplining in advance, rather punished 
afterwards, in fact very strictly. 
 
As result of all of these, the institutional and policy frameworks were unable to 
properly absorb the members and answer the later challenges. Clearly, the EU could not 
exempt itself from the global financial crisis, but the deficiencies of the euro’s construction 
aggravated the situation, and resulted in a serious crisis of the single currency. It was not a 
classical currency crisis (inflation or devaluation), but rather a sovereign debt crisis of certain 
members, but it lead even the questioning of the mere existence of the whole system. We still 
do not know how the falling out of a member (Grexit) would affect the fate of the whole euro-
zone. 
The deficiency of policy and institutional frameworks can be raised also in terms of 
accommodation of the new members into the EMU. While the setting of Maastricht criteria 
with aim of achieving sustainable monetary and fiscal stability was an important decision, , 
one can raise several questions about their relevance to the new CEE members. We abstain 
from discussing it in detail, as there is a large literature on the issue, but we raise three 
questions, which affect the meeting of the Maastricht criteria and the EMU membership of the 
Central European countries. 
 The major criterion of Maastricht in terms of monetary stability is in fact a 
direct targeting of inflation. The main aim of price stability, among others is primarily related 
to maintaining competitiveness of the member countries. There is an absolute target of the 
European Central Bank, which set a ceiling of price increases in 2%, and while it tolerates 
them up to 3% (reality of years before the financial crisis), it corresponds to the upper limits 
of “desirable inflation”. In case of Maastricht this ceiling seems to be relative, setting the 
average of the three “best performing” countries as a benchmark. It is true that it lets a 1.5% 
upward deviation, but still in absolute terms, the target could be deflationary. And that could 
be particularly the case with the new Eastern member. A 2% price increase can be 
problematic, if the growth of productivity is less than 1%. But even 3% inflation could cause 
no problems if the productivity increase is around 4% (or even more), as it was the case with 
the most of new Eastern members following the mid 1990s, up to the financial crisis. This 
targeted price rigidity may contradict to the interest of emerging countries with long road to 
convergence. 
 The same applies to the limits sets on budgetary deficits. The Maastricht 3% 
deficit is a realistic target. But the frameworks set by the Fiscal Compact through assuming a 
balanced budget, are more problematic. According to the historical experiences, the catching 
up countries usually required budget deficits for financing their modernisation. As the 
accumulated debt finances the creation of competitive capacities, it does not cause any 
problem. It was, of course, a different case, when the credits were mostly used for financing 
consumption of mistaken modernisation projects, as it happened in the 1980s with Hungary or 
Poland. The Central European countries are in the process of their convergence, and this can 
last for decades. The frameworks of the Fiscal Compact contradict their interests. 
 The Maastricht criteria assume the candidates countries to be in ERM for at 
least two years as a condition of entry into the euro zone. As historical experiences suggest, 
the exchange rate bands can be tempting from points of view of speculation. The most 
dramatic example was the UK in 1992, when the wrongly set band proved effective in 
provoking an attack against the pound, and in which case even the +/-6% proved to be too 
narrow. It was not by chance that the bands in ERM1 were broadened to +/-15% in 1993. 
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Hungary had an ERM2 imitation from 2001 (+/-15%), but gave it up in 2008, due to the 
speculative threats of the financial crisis. Among others, the three Central European countries 
float the rate of their currencies due to this reason. Therefore, many feel totally relevant and 
supportable the proposal of the Polish finance minister, which raises the possibility of 
abolishment of the ERM2 participation requirement in favour of exchange rate stability 
without band limitations. “Some policy makers have even said they believe that in Poland’s 
case the requirement that the zloty enter ERM-2 for two yours before entry, could be 
wavered.” “Policy makers and economists have long said that entering the euro zone’s pre-
adoption currency corridor would be risky for Poland because it would encourage speculation 
in the highly liquid zloty, and could push up prices of consumer goods.” (Reuters, 4 June 
2014.) 
 
Originally there were fears on the old members’ side, including the main institutions 
(Commission, ECB or the European Parliament), that the accession of the new Eastern 
members into the euro project may undermine the stability of the whole system. The five new 
euro members from the Eastern region so far have not proved that expectation. Steps were for 
rather stiffening the conditions, and the acceptance and recognition of the special needs of 
these countries was practically lacking. Meeting the requirement of Maastricht is acceptable 
for these countries, and the problems are related to the whole euro-zone. 
 
3. ADJUSTMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF EURO – INTERESTS AND POLICIES 
3.1. Uncertain prospects 
The CEE new members, concerning the monetary integration, took different course of policies 
and actions. While all of them accepted to contractual obligations concerning the EMU, as far 
as adoption of the euro, they show great differences. Although each of them have their own 
interests, attitude or policies, we can put them roughly into three main groups. 
1. There are five countries (the Baltic countries, Slovenia and Slovakia), who joined 
the euro-zone up to 2015 and fully adapted the monetary policy part of the EU treaties. The 
majority of their population supports euro-zone membership and they fully participate in the 
Euro Group. 
2. The three Central European countries of the Visegrad Four (Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland) take a hesitant position, they are highly critical about the euro project, 
and they have no definitely set deadline for joining. Their population has a contradictory 
attitudes towards the euro. In Hungary, although the number of rejecters increased, according 
to a 2012 poll, the pro and con views were more or less in balance. On the other hand, in 
Czech Republic and in Poland the majority of the population were against euro zone entry. As 
it is noted in a survey: “In 2012, support for the single currency has steeply declined over the 
five year period, between 2007-2012, where it once represented a majority.” By 2012, only 
50% of Hungarians supported the euro, while 42% were against. In the other two countries the 
opinions were more negative, in Poland only 36% supported and 56% were against, and in 
Czech Republic 22% supported and 74% was against. The three countries with the highest fall 
of support were the Czech Republic (38 points) Denmark (24 points) and Poland (18 points) 
(Notre Europe 2012: 22). For 2015, the Eurobarometer polls, particularly for Hungary show 
somewhat different pictures (the two are not comparable) In April of 2015, 60% of 
Hungarians were in favour, and 35% against the euro, in Poland 44% in favour, 53% against, 
while in Czech Republic only 29% in favour and 70% against (Eurobarometer 2015). 
3. The three later comers (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) are more positive about 
joining the euro zone, the majority of their public opinion (except in Croatia) is for the euro. 
In April of 2015, the Romanian government declared that it is still committed to its target for 
euro adoption in 2019, and able to comply with all nominal convergence criteria. Bulgaria and 
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Croatia do not have an official target date for introducing the euro. There are preparations, but 
references are made about waiting till the euro crisis is over. 
The euro enjoys very high support in Romania. In April 2015, 68% of Romanians 
supported the euro, and only 26% were against. The same data for Croatia was 53% in favour 
and 40% against, while for Bulgaria 55% for and 40% against (Eurobarometer 2015). 
As so far the political will and determination played primary role, the three later 
comers have chance to be the next entrants of the euro project. The ongoing financial and 
migration crisis, however, may delay their euro adoptions, despite the fact that they are close 
to meeting the Maastricht criteria. 
 
3.2. Influencing factors 
Euro-zone accession can be motivated and influenced by several political, legal, social, 
cultural or even emotional factors. We analyse the political and social aspects through 
changes in the interest and position of professional, business and political elite, and the role 
of the media. Legal problems can also arise. When a country decides about euro zone 
participation geopolitical, security or sovereignty considerations can also have an impact. 
The big differences among the countries can be explained by different factors, and in 
these respects, the domestic political situations and scenes play an important role. In the all 
analysed countries, most of the parties are not against euro adoption, although they attach 
different importance to it. Seemingly, the parties and politicians are concerned rather with 
their short term political interests, and if the euro preparation would mean unpopular 
stabilisation measures, they rather refrain from the issue. That was particularly the case with 
Hungary after 2002, when the chances of euro adoption by the projected time (end of the 
decade) were missed. As, in fact, it is rightly noted on Hungary: “Politicians who were mainly 
seeking domestic political gains (in terms of attracting voters through pledges to enhance 
voter income) were not at all focused on taking the necessary steps that will lead eventually to 
euro adoption” (Dandashly – Verdun 2009: 12). That remained characteristic to all parties and 
for all election campaigns. And we can state that it was so in the other countries as well.  
The opponents of the euro are of rather extreme right or left wing parties. In Hungary, 
the Jobbik, in Czech Republic the Communists, and in Poland the Law and Justice Party 
(PIS), which have strong reservations, particularly against rapid joining. In most cases, the 
opponents are not organised along party lines. Although they are not in majority, with the 
exception of PIS, they could be strong enough to influence the attitudes of the governments. 
Persons can play an important role too. In the Czech Republic, while Václav Havel 
was in favour, Václav Klaus took a euro-sceptic position. They were both influential towards 
political parties and the opinion of the public. The other country’s experience proves that it 
matters which party is in government, who is the president of the central bank and who sits on 
its board.  
The ambivalent position to euro zone joining in the analysed countries can be 
explained by the interests and policies of certain leading business circles. These interests are 
fairly unanimous, but they are not without contradictions. For foreign TNCs, the introduction 
of the Euro is not at all urgent as large part of their transactions is already conducted in Euro. 
“The Skoda Auto, the Czech car company that is owned by Volkswagen Group, deals mainly 
in euros” (Prague Post, 16 August 2014). The existence of national exchange rate gives them 
better opportunity for manipulation with transfer prices and tax evasion. They are better 
positioned in speculation on financial markets, which can far compensate for losses in 
transaction costs. The domestic exporting firms are the most ferment proponents, particularly 
in the Czech Republic and Poland, while some others, often influential, are counter-interested. 
These are those who face direct competition from foreign investors and rivals, and dependent 
on imports and EU transfers. Some fear that by giving up the national currency, the 
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dominance of foreign TNCs could further increase. As many of them have a low level of 
transnationalisation, the possible savings in transaction costs do not matter too much for them. 
Devaluation may offer transitory improvements in their short-term competitive positions, and 
through it in their trade and financial (speculative) affairs they may realise even extra-profits 
in the short run. Through devaluation, the revenues from abroad (from off-shore businesses or 
EU structural and CAP transfers) could be up valued. The aspects of tax evasion also apply in 
these spheres. The interest and views of trade unions are also contradictory. 
When analysing euro adoption prospects, the state of euroisation of the country should 
be taken into consideration. Euroisation, similarly to dollarization, means a special dual (or 
parallel) currency system, where besides the national currency the euro is in broad use in the 
monetary circulation. As the exchanges through the transnational networks affect a large part 
of GDP of these countries, these transactions mean a certain sort of creeping euroisation of 
these countries. The free movements of capital, which is legal, already covers a substantial 
amount of exchanges. In addition, we should mention those payments in hotels, supermarkets 
or other places, which are conducted in euro in all the countries. The role of this creeping 
euroisation has dual purpose. It can bring full introduction of the euro closer, but it can delay 
it as well as it already saves transaction costs. 
The level of euroisation would need surveys and research concerning each country. 
Due to traditional links among the euro candidates, probably the most euroised country is 
Croatia. Many Croatian small enterprises denominate their debts in euro, and most of the real 
estate, motor vehicle or accommodation prices are quoted in euro. The euro is broadly used by 
the population for saving and informal transfers. From the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo and 
Montenegro unilaterally adopted the euro since 2002. 
The role of the media in the process is highly controversial. In Poland, “the media is 
also not very interested in the euro accession process. Attention on this issue picks up when 
something happens with exchange rate of the zloty or the euro. Otherwise the euro accession 
policy is not attracting very much attention.” (Verdun 2010: 35) The same applies to the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. The media follows the euro exchange rate fluctuation, but 
otherwise is not interested in the question. In one sense, we can state that there is no media for 
euro in these countries, promoting a real and professional discussion about the pros and cons. 
As politicians are afraid of loosing votes, they refrain from even mentioning the issue, 
particularly during the election campaign (see Verdun 2010’s reference to the Czech elections 
in October 2009). In reality, reporting only about the problems caused by the crisis means 
practically a continuous negative campaign, and the public gets only negative information. In 
the countries where the euro has been already introduced and the public has direct experience, 
the opinions are, in fact, overwhelmingly positive. The rejection of the euro often meant no 
more that “citizens have not felt the euro adaptation issue to be all that important.” 
(Dandashly and Verdun 2009: 10)  
Analyses of costs and benefits of euro use brought contradictory results, they do not 
give any clear cut and overwhelming arguments either pro or con in the discussion about the 
introduction of the single currency. Definitely, these arguments are not strong enough to 
influence the attitudes of politicians or the public into either directions. This does not mean 
that it is not important to create a real and objective media presentation on the issue, because 
the present negative campaigns can make great damage and divert the debate dealing with the 
issue according to its merits. 
Expert discussion can play important role. One can note that as far as the Hungarian 
experts of the euro issue are concerned, they are overwhelmingly in favour of joining the 
euro-zone, while in Poland and Czech Republic the expert elites are more divided (see 
Palankai 2006). 
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Cultural or emotional factors can also be important. They can be attached to anxiety 
about national independence, identity or sovereignty or to devotion to symbols, like the strong 
national currency. “To some extent symbolic factors play a role. Euro is a strong symbol of 
European integration; a national currency is a strong symbol of national identification.” 
(Verdun 2010: 27-28). In Poland and Czech Republic the arguments against the euro often 
referred to the strong zloty and koruna as a symbol of country success and strength. “Poland’s 
reform, economic growth, its stable economy (compared to other EU countries such as 
Hungary) even after the crisis were not enough to get closer to euro adoption” (Dandashly 
2012: 234).  
For the sake of euro adoption several legal problems should be solved. As far as the 
disputes over compliance with the requirements of central bank independence are concerned, 
they have been solved, or in case, remaining problems can be easily dealt with. The need for 
changing constitutions is a more formidable problem, and as among others both the Polish 
and the Hungarian constitution pledges to present national currency, this can not be avoided. 
It assumes in both country a two third majority decision of parliament, and this is hardly 
possible without the consensus of the major political parties.  
The joining of the euro zone may raise several sovereignty and security questions, and 
such related considerations can play an important role. It has a different aspect in different 
countries, and can influence the politics or public opinion concerning the mere question of 
joining or its timing. In case of Poland, it is seemingly important both from the point of view 
of its EU position and security of the country. The security considerations were particularly 
strengthened by the recent confrontation between the West and Russia. “The new appetite for 
potential accession to the 18-members euro zone appeared to be a reaction to Russia’s 
annexation in March of territories in Poland’s neighbour Ukraine” (Reuters, 4 June 2014). 
“Entering the euro-zone would be, in a strategic take, another anchor that would maintain 
Poland in the group of the most important Western nations and increase our security” “Poland 
will join the euro in the future because adoption of Europe’s common currency would raise its 
status among the Western nations.” (Reuters, 9 April 2014.) According to Donald Tusk, the 
euro joining “is also a geopolitical project.”  
Similar considerations motivated the Baltic countries. In light of a growing Russian 
threat, they strived to connect themselves to the West more closely. For Slovakia, the 
extension of its sovereignty played a role, particularly in terms of getting direct participation 
in decisions. One thing is, however, clear: except extraordinary circumstances, with great 
probability, none would join the euro zone until the crisis is over. As Marek Belka, President 
of the Polish Central Bank stated in 2015: “You shouldn’t rush when there is still smoke 
coming out from a house that was burning. It is simply not safe to do so. As long as the euro 
zone has problems with some of its members, don’t expect us to be enthusiastic about 
joining.” 
In fact, the story of Greece is not yet finished, and Grexit cannot be excluded. The 
discussion of euro adoption in 2014, in both the Czech Republic and Poland were taken off 
the agenda, seemingly due to the Greek and migration crises. There is a wait and see policy 
and there are no new developments on the horizon, which can easily change this picture. 
What is needed, it is more than over-coming the present crisis. As the defects of the 
euro have become apparent, it is hard to expect many of the candidates to take it, before these 
defects are repaired.  
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